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PROTECTION OF THE INSTALLMENT BUYER 
OF GOODS UNDER THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE 
Robert H. Skilton* and Orrin L. Helstad** 
BUYING on the installment plan has become a way of life for many in the United States.1 The post-World War II years have seen 
installment credit expanded for the purchase of all kinds of consumer 
durable goods, from television sets to cars and motor boats, as well as 
for purchase by credit card and revolving charge account of non-
durable goods and services-once the exclusive domain of cash and 
single-payment credit transactions. 
An installment sales transaction has several characteristics that 
draw special attention to it. Usually, but not invariably, the buyer 
intends to use the goods for personal or household purposes, and 
thus falls within that group of persons somewhat crassly called "con-
sumers." Now there is nothing in that term which necessarily sepa-
rates one man from another, for all of us, regardless of occupation, 
are consumers of the goods and services supplied by others. In any 
given transaction, however, one party may be the consumer and the 
other the supplier. In a sale of goods transaction, it is typically the 
merchant on one side and the consumer on the other. We will have 
to push the point beyond this to make sense. The typical consumer 
that we have in mind is one who in the trans~ction lacks knowledge 
and skill and must depend upon the other party to supply these 
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1, The growth of the use of installment credit by consumers is dramatically illus-
trated by the following figures taken from the January 1967 FED. REsERVE BuLL. 132. 
Figures are shown in billions of dollars of outstanding consumer credit, not including 
real estate mortgage loans, 
Year Total Installment N oninstallment 
1939 7.222 4.503 2.719 
1941 9.172 6.085 .,. 3.087 
1945 5.665 2.462 3.203 
1960 56.028 42.832 13.196 
1961 57.678 43.527 14.151 
1962 63.164 48.034 15.130 
1963 70.461 54.158 16.303 
1964 78.442 60.548 17.894 
1965 87.884 68.565 19.319 
1966 (Nov.) 92.498 73.491 19.007 
[ 1465] 
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ingredients. Moreover, if he is an installment buyer, we suppose that 
he often lacks the immediate funds to buy for cash or on single-
payment credit terms. But we must not harden our stereotype, 
since many luxuries are bought on the installment plan. 
When the installment sale is of durable goods, it would seem that 
almost inevitably the transaction will be set forth in a written con-
tract. Since this form has been prepared privately and in advance 
under the seller's auspices, it can be expected to be protective to the 
seller, rather than to the buyer. The form becomes truly objection-
able if it contains terms which go beyond the limits of the law in its 
endeavor to protect the seller from such matters as liability for 
breach of warranty, or if it purports to give the seller an unrestricted 
hand in the event of the buyer's default. Without a systematic study 
of business practices in this area, we cannot say how widespread is 
the use of such overreaching clauses in sales contracts. In any event, 
our stereotype supposes that the buyer, when presented with this form 
contract to sign, is not in a position to bargain with respect to its 
details, even if he knows what the terms really mean. 
Another characteristic of the installment sale is that very often a 
finance charge is added to the cash price, thereby giving rise to such 
questions as whether a ceiling should be placed on the amount that 
may be charged, whether the seller should be required to disclose in 
writing the amount and nature of all charges, whether a partial re-
fund of pre-computed finance charges should be required upon re-
payment, and so forth. Finally, many installment sales, particularly 
those of durable goods, are secured transactions. They may raise 
questions as to the advisability of restricting the seller's rights on 
default, and perhaps other rights, in transactions involving special 
classes of persons such as consumers. 
In the post-World War II years, a considerable amount of state 
legislation dealing with installment sales of goods to consumers has 
been enacted.2 Many of these statutes deal with installment sales of 
motor vehicles, but quite a few deal with goods other than motor 
vehicles-the so-called "all goods" statutes-and some include ser-
vices as well. The situation varies from state to state.3 In Wisconsin, 
for example, there is special legislation regulating installment sales 
2. The regulation of installment sales financing began in 1935 in Indiana and Wis-
consin. By 1950, 12 states had enacted such laws. Four more joined this group between 
1950 and 1957 and 10 more in 1957. See Britton 8: Ulrich, The Illinois Retail Install-
ment Sales Act-Historical Background and Comparative Legislation, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 
137, 150-52 (1958) • .By the end of 1964, 42 states had enacted some type of retail install-
ment sales act. See CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 254-55 (1965). 
3. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION (1965). 
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of motor vehicles, 4 but none for other goods. The reason is obvious. 
Installment sales of motor vehicles is a compact, manageable subject. 
It is more difficult to deal in a single statute with the vast miscellane-
ous remainder of installment transactions. 
In states lacking such special legislation, most of the legal disputes 
between installment sellers and buyers involve the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (Code). Even in states which have special legislation, 
problems not covered by the statutes may nonetheless fall within the 
provisions of the Code. The status of the installment buyer under the 
Code is therefore a matter of concern no matter how pervasive a given 
state's scheme of special regulations may be. 
The present topic for discussion, protection of the installment 
buyer under the Code, is part of a larger topic-protection of the 
consumer under the Code. The remarks that follow sometimes apply 
generally to the status of the consumer under the Code. There are 
times when no distinction should be made between our model install-
ment buyer and other consumer buyers. 
I. THE CODE AND THE CONSUMER 
The Code, now adopted in most of the states, 5 has much to say 
which has bearing on transactions involving the installment sale of 
goods to consumers, even though it rarely, if ever, singles out install-
ment sales to consumers for special treatment. Thus, Article Two 
applies to the sales aspects of such transactions and if, as is frequently 
the case, the buyer's obligation to pay is secured, Article Nine comes 
in to deal with the secured aspects. And if a negotiable or non-negotia-
ble instrument is involved, Article Three also applies. These three 
articles (together with general Article One) must be tied together 
and reconciled when legal controversies between installment seller 
and buyer arise. If reconciliation is not possible, it may sometimes 
be necessary to determine which provision of which article should 
control. The comment to section 2-102 declares that "The Article 
leaves substantially unaffected the law relating to purchase money 
security such as conditional sale or chattel mortgage though it regu-
lates the general sales aspects of such transactions." Thus it is clear 
that the installment buyer has just as much right to complain of 
breach of warranty by the seller as the cash buyer. But some other 
matters are not so clear. What terms and conditions of the trans-
4. Wrs. SrAT. § 218.01 (1965). Enactment of bills currently before the Wisconsin 
legislature would result in broader coverage. 
5. To date, only Louisiana has not adopted the Code. In addition it is in effect in 
both the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands. 
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actions may be regarded as general sales aspects and what as security 
interest aspects? 
The text of the Code is almost barren of provisions specially 
designed for the protection of the consumer as such.6 At a fairly 
early stage in the drafting of the Code a fundamental decision was 
made-to retreat-to scuttle attempts to introduce elements of social 
legislation restrictive of sales and credit practices conceived to be 
antisocial.7 At this point the project of a Code took shape out of a 
law professor's pipe dream and emerged into the world of practical 
men. In other words, it gained important friends. 
Some vestiges of earlier concern with making the Code consumer-
oriented survived the Great Decision. But in 1956 there was a 
further retreat. The present version can hardly be said to offer 
much affirmatively to the consumer point of view. One has only to 
contemplate the remains of Sections 2-316(1) and 9-206 to appreciate 
that there has been attrition. 8 
6. The present version of the Code has few textual references to consumers. Article 
Nine defines "consumer goods" but not consumers apart from their goods. This is not 
without significance. One important reason for classifying a security interest as being 
in consumer goods is to provide for the perfection upon attaching, without filing or 
possession, of purchase money security interests in consumer goods, except for motor 
vehicles and fixtures. Such provision seems to be of more direct benefit to the secured 
party than to the debtor, since the secured party's priority over third party claims is 
involved. Of course, some of the provisions giving special treatment to consumer goods 
may be beneficial to the consumer. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-204(4)(b), 
-206(1) & -505(1) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.]. Some Article Two provisions which may 
be of benefit to the consumer in some states are §§ 2-318 and -719(3). 
7. In the May 1949 draft of what is now Article Nine, there appeared a separate part 
containing several sections dealing with consumer financing. Included in this part were 
provisions which (a) required an itemized disclosure in the contract of the elements 
making up the time and price; (b) made the security interest unenforceable against the 
consumer unless he had received a signed copy of the contract which, in addition to the 
price disclosure items, conspicuously indicated that the contract gave the secured party 
the right to repossess on default; (c) subjected the holder in due course of a consumer's 
note to the consumer's contract defenses if the holder asserted rights against the col-
lateral; (d) invalidated an after-acquired property interest which attached more than 
ten days after the consumer had agreed to give a security interest; (e) discharged the 
consumer from his obligation to the extent of any insurance proceeds received by the 
secured party; (f) regulated, in the consumer's interest, such devices as lay-away plans 
and add-on contracts; and {g) regulated the tights of both parties on default. These 
provisions turned out to be among the most controversial provisions considered in the 
drafting of the Code. They were attacked both on the ground that they were social 
legislation unfair to lenders and inappropriate in a codification of commercial law, 
and on the ground that they provided merely illusory protection for the consumer. 
See 1 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 293-94 (1965). See also 
Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAw &: CON• 
TEMP. PROB. 27, 37-40, 44-48 (1951). 
8. For changes made in these sections in 1956, see 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 39-40, 270-71. In the 1952 
Official Draft, § 2-316(1) stated simply that "If the agreement creates an express war-
ranty, words disclaiming it are inoperative." Compare the present text. The attrition 
in § 9-206 is discussed infra. See also note 7 supra. 
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Consumer-oriented persons can take solace in the fact that the text 
of certain articles expressly leaves the door open for other legislation, 
apart from the Code, to make special provision for the consumer 
interest. Thus section 2-102 of the Article on Sales declares that the 
Article does not "impair or repeal any statute regulating sales to 
consumers, farmers, or other specified classes of buyers." And Article 
Nine on Secured Transactions declares in section 9-201: "Nothing 
in this Article validates any charge or practice illegal under any 
statute or regulation thereunder governing usury, small loans, retail 
installment sales, or the like, or extends the application of any such 
statute or regulation to any transaction not otherwise subject 
thereto." 
Some justification for the policy of almost total abstinence may lie 
in complexities inherent in problems of consumer protection. Any-
one who has had some experience in proposing or drafting legislation 
for installments sales knows how controversial are many of the 
questions, how bereft of easy answers. Just to get a taste of some of 
them: what kinds of transactions should be included? Only sales for 
personal and household purposes? Then what about the small farmer 
buying a tractor for farm use or the little old lady buying a refriger-
ator for her boarding house? Second, what, if any, terms and practices 
should be prohibited? High on the list of controversial questions are 
whether holder in due course status should be denied transferees of 
consumer notes given to sellers, and whether cut-off clauses should 
be prohibited in conditional sales contracts. Should restrictions be 
placed on the kinds of permissible collateral, and upon wage garnish-
ment as a means of collection? Third, what sanctions should be 
adopted to make the Act effective? Blunderbuss criminal provisions? 
Licensing, with its threat of suspension and revocation? Should there 
be an administrator with broad powers to inspect records? Lastly, 
what about rate ceilings and other financial provisions? Would high 
or low ceilings, or no ceilings, be best? Should sellers be required to 
state the simple interest equivalents of their time price differentials? 
Survey the legislation that has been enacted to date in the various 
states, and note the wide disparities.9 Many variations in content are 
no doubt somehow related to the tugs in the legislative process. A 
bare bones statute providing for disclosure of charges as itemized, with 
modest provision for partial refund of finance charge upon prepay-
ment and comfortably high ceilings on finance charges, while offer-
ing some bones to the consumer, may be basically the contrivance of 
9. See .Britton &: Ulrich, supra note 2, ·at 152-54. 
1470 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65:1465 
finance company or department store cohorts, designed to remove 
the shadow of doubt cast by usury laws upon revolving charge and 
that sacred cow, the seller's time price differential, which only 
heretics confuse with interest.10 In other statutes, where the con-
sumer's point of view seemingly has prevailed more often, one can 
discover a miscellaneous mess of protective provisions sometimes 
asymmetrically making special rules for installment sales at the 
expense of broader treatment; containing some provisions with in-
dicia of patch-work compromise raising questions whether their 
seeming ameliorative value outweighs their boomerang potential. 
All this for the benefit of the "consumer," in the name of "public 
policy"-a figure and an idea which are elusive, intangible. What is 
good for one consumer is not necessarily good for another. For ex-
ample, to set low ceilings on rates may benefit one, but deprive 
another of the chance to buy on time something he should be per-
mitted to buy in the name of free choice or need, or may force him 
into the unconscionable black market of credit. Who can say where 
wisdom lies? What we need is more and more probings into practice. 
We need studies, dispassionately made let us hope, to identify the real 
evils, to ascertain their dimensions, to evaluate the proposed reme-
dies. Less heat, and more light. Otherwise, there is the risk of doing 
more harm than good. 
All in all, perhaps a case could be made for the Code's position of 
refraining from an attempt at uniformity pending the development 
of consensus. Meanwhile, each state is to formulate its own ideas as 
to beneficial regulation. 
It does not necessarily follow, however, that the Code withdrew 
to a position of complete neutrality. There are too many sections of 
the Code which may have bearing on the resolution of the ofttimes 
conflicting interests of merchant and consumer for neutrality to be 
achievable. In many cases answers are furnished or routes suggested 
which perforce represent a choosing between two points of view. 
Many examples may be cited: a few must suffice. 
Section 2-718(2) might be cited as a provision which is less favor-
able to the consumer. When this provision applies, it permits a seller, 
upon default by the buyer, to deduct and keep that part of the buyer's 
prepayment which is 20% of the "value of the total performance for 
which the buyer is obligated" or $500, whichever is less. This pro-
vision may, in certain situations, be downright onerous to the buyer, 
whatever justification there may be in protecting the seller's expecta-
10. See id. at 152. One of the authors of this article could also cite personal experi-
ence in suppo-rt of these statements. 
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tion interest. The Code simply cannot be neutral on many points-
the truism is better understood by considering some of the protective 
measures that were repealed by enactment of the Code. Thus, the 
Uniform Conditional Sales Act could reasonably be construed to per-
mit a buyer in default to reinstate the contract by paying the amount 
of past defaults, even if there were an acceleration clause in the 
contract which purported to make the entire obligation due and 
payable upon default.11 The Code takes a different view.12 
On the other hand, we do not want to convey the impression 
that the choices made by the Code were in all cases less favorable 
to the consumer than before. Thus, a consumer-buyer can sometimes 
claim special protection as a "buyer in the ordinary course of busi-
ness"-one of the favorites in the dramatis personae of the Code. 
Section 9-307 (I) provides that such a person takes free of a security 
interest given by his seller even though it is perfected and even 
though he knows that it exists. And section 2-403(2) similarly pro-
tects such a buyer from the title claims of one who has entrusted 
the seller with the goods. See also section 7-205. Such special provi-
sions, while important to the consumer, have limited application in 
that they normally are concerned only with the question of the title 
the buyer acquires.13 
Various other provisions of the Code can be interpreted as open-
ing up or expanding possibilities of consumer protection.14 Perhaps 
11. See 47 AM. JUR. Sales § 959; annot., 99 A.L.R. 1301 (1935). For a detailed com-
parison of Article Nine's various remedies provisions with those of the Uniform 
Conditional Sales Act, see Comment, 39 MARQ. L. R.Ev. 246 (1956). 
12. See U.C.C. § 9-506, comment: "[I]f the agreement contains a clause accelerating 
the entire balance due on default in one installment, the entire balance would have to 
be tendered.'' 
13. It may also be noted that the protection which § 9-307(1) affords a consumer as 
a buyer in the ordinary course of business does not extend the scope of protection 
afforded by pre-Code law in many states and that, while § 9-307(2) probably does 
expand the protection afforded by pre-Code law in some states, its scope is very 
limited. Section 2-403(2) provides similarly limited benefits if we consider that the per-
son who entrusts goods to a person, such as for repair purposes, may be just as much a 
consumer as the person who might buy the entrusted goods. 
14. With limited exceptions, the present version of the Code imposes the black 
letter rules of its text without distinction in favor of or against the consumer. Never-
theless, we should not overlook the obvious fact that the kind of person involved in a 
Code controversy-for example, a consumer-can be often of critical importance, al-
though the black letter text does not so state. The fact that a person is a "consumer" 
may have to be taken into account in the interpretation of an agreement, in the 
determination of the reasonableness of a contractual standard, and in the application of 
a statutory rule to a specific case. For example, comment 4 to § 2-607(3), dealing with 
the requirement of notice of breach where the buyer has accepted goods, advises that 
" 'a reasonable time' for notification from a retail consumer is to be judged by different 
standards so that in his case it will be extended, for the rule of requiring notification 
is designed to defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive a good faith consumer of 
his remedy.'' 
Article Two is much more concerned with whether a party to a transaction in goods 
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chief among the Code sections with such possibilities is section 
2-302, to be discussed below.15 
II. THE CODE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 
A. General Principles 
At the risk of being charged with sniping tactics, we would note 
that while section 1-205 goes to considerable length to define "usage 
of trade" and describe its role in the contract so that, as between 
those subject to trade usage, a party may be held to have accepted 
some business practices as part of the contractual undertakings, 
there is little in the Code which takes similar cognizance of con-
sumer usage or consumer understanding. Of course, we are now 
touching upon the central, most important problem of contract law: 
the ascertainment and effectuation of the real agreement between 
the parties. Traditionalist at heart, the Code does not seem to deny 
the basic premise that what a written contract signed by the parties 
says is the private law of the parties. 
All the way back to the days of personal seals we can trace the 
axiom that what a man formerly sealed (and now signs) he should 
be held to--that he adopts the language of the instrument he seals 
even though he acts in haste, as known by the other party, or without 
comprehension, as known by the other party.16 This respect for the 
importance of the signed word is tested when a court is called upon 
to apply the so-called parol evidence rule, for then the court must 
face the difficult question of when a signed writing should be held to 
be the final and exclusive expression of the parties' intention. Article 
Two states a parol evidence rule which adds nothing in particular. 
has the status of "merchant,'' as defined. Occasionally the textual rule expressly depends 
upon whether the buyer or seller is a "merchant." Further, Article Two gives a special 
definition of "good faith" for merchants which seems to require more than honesty in 
fact. Since § 1-203 makes every contract or duty subject to an obligation of good faith 
in performance or enforcement, the fact that a party is a merchant may be highly 
operative in determining standards in any Article Two situation. Wherever, for this 
reason, higher standards are imposed upon merchants than upon non-merchants, the 
consumer may be benefited, since he is generally a non-merchant. 
One commentator sees in the Code's treatment of unconscionability, good faith, 
commercial reasonableness, merchant responsibility, title and good faith purchase a new 
conceptualism based on the relationship of the parties in the overall setting, which he 
terms the Code's "new business ethic." See King, New Conceptualism of the Uniform 
Commercial Code: Ethics, Title, and Good Faith Purchase, 11 ST. Louxs U.L.J. 15 (1966). 
To the extent ,that this is so, the consumer obviously is more likely to be a gainer than 
a loser. 
15. See text accompanying notes 20-25 infra. 
16. Of course, we recognize that exceptions to the rule may be found under headings 
such as fraud, mistake, undue influence and the like. 
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Presumably the courts will do as before; some will apply the rule 
more leniently than others.17 
If we suppose that recognition of the principle of freedom of 
contract carries in its wake recognition of the binding force of the 
verbalisms of form contracts as against parties who did not write 
them, the basic policy of the Code-freedom of contract-tends to 
favor sellers and lenders more than buyers and debtors.18 Still, we 
would not discount the possibility that in ascertaining the existence 
and meaning of "otherwise" agreements under the Code, a court may 
find that the "bargain in fact" goes to the realities rather than the 
written form of agreement. Thus, a form contract for the sale of tires 
to a consumer may contain language disclaiming or drastically limit-
ing the remedy on any warranty as to durability and character of 
the subject matter. But use of the simple word "tires" in the contract 
could mean, in the opinion of some courts, that the things sold must 
measure up to tires as functionally defined-things suitable for use 
on cars. Is a papier-mache tire a tire?19 Ultimately, it is how the courts 
apply the rules that counts. Freedom of contract means nothing un-
til we have answered the question: What standards do the courts use 
in ascertaining what the contract really is? Here the Code breaks no 
new ground. 
The counter-principle to freedom of contract is status law-the 
imposition by statute or judicial decision of a standard which adheres 
to the relationship between the parties and cannot be contracted 
away. Thus, section 1-102(3) says that obligations of good faith, due 
care, and diligence, when imposed by the Code, cannot be con-
tracted away, although the parties may define the "standards" for 
the fulfillment of such duties. 
Perhaps the most noteworthy assertion of this counter-principle 
in the Code is section 2-302, which limits the effect of the principle 
of freedom of contract in the sale of goods. It provides: 
17. There may be differences of opinion as to the exact effect of U.C.C. § 2-202, and 
it may even have a liberalizing influence on the law of some states. See, for 
example, Professor Patterson's analysis for the New York Law Revision Commission, I 
N.Y. LAW REv. Co11r. REP. 597-601 (1955). 
18. It may be noted that early drafts of the Code tended to restrict freedom of 
contract more than do the present drafts. For a fuller discussion of this subject, see 
Bunn, Freedom of Contract Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 B.C. IND. &: COM. 
L. REV. 59 (1960). 
19. In the appropriate case, this view as to the realities might lead a court to find 
an express warranty of description, thus resulting in application of § 2-316(1). 
Although the weasel words of present § 2-316(1) were substituted for the forth-
right statement in the 1952 draft that "if the agreement creates an express war-
ranty, words disclaiming it are inoperative," an argument can be made that the sub-
stance was not changed. See Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 723, 739 (1963). 
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(1) if the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause 
of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made 
the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the 
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it 
may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid 
any unconscionable result. 
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or 
any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be 
afforded an opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial 
setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the deter-
mination. 
This is one of the more controversial sections of the Code; indeed, 
it was deleted from the California and North Carolina versions.20 
We regard these deletions as unfortunate. It is not that section 
2-302 says very much; it is simply that it gives a court a peg to hang 
its hat on if it is of a mind to redress a contractual imbalance. There 
is nothing in the principle of section 2-302 that is particularly new, 
startling, or strange. We have only to reflect upon the development 
in Chancery of the equity of redemption-recognition of the right of 
a mortgagor to redeem after the law day had passed and the title of 
the mortgagee had according to the deed become absolute. What ;vas 
this but one illustration among many of the assertion of judicial 
power to set aside an unconscionable forfeiture called for by a con-
tract term? Of course, the alarmist's fear is that section 2-302 invites 
a court to go further than before in screening contracts. While there 
is nothing in the text itself calling for such action, the very presence 
of section 2-302, in all of its frankness, is apt to dispel hesitancy. 
Under a qualification introduced in 1956 the contract clause must 
be found to have been unconscionable at the time the contract was 
made.21 It is doubtful that this qualification will greatly restrict 
utilization of the concept of unconscionability, for the character of 
the clause when made might still be tested by hindsight, so that the 
clause might be viewed in light of the situation which arose subse-
quent to its inclusion in the contract. Another, and perhaps more 
meaningful, limitation upon the free play of the court's judgment 
is the explicit requirement in subsection (2) that there be an oppor-
tunity for a hearing on the questions of the commercial setting, 
purpose, and effect of the agreement. The question of unconscion-
ability is probably wisely made a matter of law, rather than a ques-
tion for the jury. 
20. See U.L.A., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 43 (Supp 1966). 
21. See 1956 REcOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 31-32. 
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Perhaps section 2-302 merely authorizes a court to take action 
which the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires 
it to take. Judicial action constitutes state action under the fourteenth 
amendment, and that amendment applies to deprivation of a per-
son's property as well as his life and liberty.22 The Supreme Court of 
the United States has for some time subjected the procedural and 
substantive aspects of the criminal law of the states to rigorous re-
examination. To date, there has been no comparable development 
of the constitutional aspects of commercial law, but surely it can be 
seen that the due process clause requires the state judiciary to observe 
minimum standards of justice in the administration of the civil law. 
The implications of Shelley23 and Barrows24 may extend far beyond 
the aspects of judicial action there involved. Perhaps we are on the 
verge of a new chapter in constitutional development. If so, many 
questions arise. For example, is "due process" of law violated when 
the judiciary permits judgment to be confessed by a person who acts 
under a power of attorney bestowed by a form contract, without 
notifying the defendant allegedly in default of the action taken, or 
without consulting him to elicit his views of the merits of the claim? 
Is it a sufficient reply to due process objections that the debtor may 
have a period of time to petition to vacate the judgment, provided 
he learns that the judgment has been entered and can retain an 
attorney to represent him? We should not sell the future short. 
Notions of what constitute fundamental justice, due process, and 
equal protection are dynamic, not static. 
The vagueness of section 2-302 is at once its blessing and its 
curse. We are not sure when it applies, or how it applies. Does it 
stand as the censor in all Article Two situations? Take the case in 
which a seller's form contract attempts to exclude the existence of 
an implied warranty of merchantability. Section 2-316(2) provides 
that this may be done by "conspicuous" language which "mentions" 
merchantability. These are perhaps mechanical requirements, which 
may be met with comparative ease. However, does section 2-302 
raise an additional hurdle to the effectiveness of the disclaimer clause? 
If it does, then pro-consumer results can be achieved under Article 
Two parallel to the results achieved if one disregards the Code and 
relies instead upon the strict tort liability approach of section 402A 
of the Restatement of Torts, Second. On the other hand, it may be 
22. Similar remarks could be made about the Fifth Amendment as governing Dis-
trict of Columbia matters. 
23. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. l (1948). 
24. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). 
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argued for the seller that section 2-316(2) is a self contained, specific 
answer to the question of what is a conscionable provision, and that 
no reference need be made to section 2-302. There is nothing in the 
comments to section 2-316 which suggests that a disclaimer comply-
ing with section 2-316(2) must still run the gantlet of section 2-302.25 
Curiously, section 2-719, which applies when a contract clause limits 
the remedies for breach of warranty, expressly provides that "limita-
tion of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case 
of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable." It would be 
illogical in our view if the same were not true when the terms of the 
contract take the form of an exclusion of warranty, rather than a 
limitation of remedy. 
B. A Case Study 
Reference to section 2-302 brings us around to the secured in-
stallment sale. Section 2-302 may have bearing, direct or indirect, 
upon Article Nine situations. It would be unwise to assume that the 
"302 Principle"26 is neatly confined to Article Two. 
In 1965 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit decided Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. 
and its companion case Thorne v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.21 
It appeared that from 1957 to 1962 Ora Lee Williams had made six-
teen separate purchases of furniture and household appliances from 
the store, all on installment credit, and in each case had signed fine 
print bailment-lease contracts which provided for monthly rental 
payments and reserved title in the store until payment was made in 
full.28 Most of these purchases were made when a representative of 
the store came to her home. Each contract provided that payments 
under the contract would be credited pro rata on that particular and 
all prior purchases from the store which had not yet been paid in 
full; the store construed these provisions to mean that payments were 
to be applied in proportion to the unpaid balance on each purchase 
(as determined at the time of each payment), with the result that no 
one purchase would be paid in full until all were paid in full. Thus, 
25. It is proper, however, to call attention to the comment to § 2-302, where illus-
trations of prior decisions within the problem area of § 2-316 are given. 
26. By accident or design, the Code section dealing with unconscionability has the 
same number as § 302 of the Restatement of Contracts which applies the same prin-
ciple to conditions in contracts in general. 
27. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The opinion below may be found in 198 A.2d 914 
(1964). 
28. Some of the information which follows was derived from the briefs filed by the 
parties with the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. See also 
the opinion of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in 121 App. D.C. 315, 198 A.2d 
914 (1964). 
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in Ora Williams' case, the store claimed a continuing lessor's interest 
in all of the goods she had bought since 1957. In 1962, Ora was sold 
a stereo record player on credit for $514.95, although, as stated on 
the reverse side of the contract her income consisted of $218 a month 
public assistance for herself and six or seven dependent children. 
That sale brought the total value of her purchases from the store 
since 1957 to about $1500, of which she had paid about $1056. When 
she defaulted some time after acquiring the stereo, the store sought 
to replevy all of the items purchased since 1957.29 The facts in the 
companion case were equally pathetic and the plights of Ora Williams 
and the Thornes prompted the intervention of the Legal .Assistance 
Office-the result was a cause celebre. 
The Legal Assistance Office was willing to concede that the 
store could repossess the stereo record player for nonpayment, but 
what stirred them to action was that the seller sought to scoop up 
all that it had ever sold to Ora. The seller maintained that it still 
had title to everything because, under the pro rata clause, a balance 
remained due on each item, despite Ora's payments of over $1,000. 
The store's records showed that of a combined total claim of $444 as 
of December 26, 1962, Ora still owed 25¢ on item 1, purchased 
December 23, 1957 (price $45.65); 3¢ on item 2, purchased December 
31, 1957 (price $13.21); $2.34 on item 3, purchased August 12, 1958 
(price $127.40); and similarly for subsequent purchases, with balances 
of $.96, $1.70, $2.86, $1.08, $7.21, $1.53, $2.38, $5.66, $10.32, and 
$1.61. The only claims which were significant in relation to the 
purchase price were for the last three purchases: an item for $254.95, 
on which a balance of $65.98 was claimed; the $514.95 stereo, on 
which a balance of $327.89 was claimed; and an item for $15.45, on 
which a balance of $12.60 was claimed.80 
What was the ultimate goal of the seller, the self-styled lessor, i:q. 
replevying the items? Taking possession of the collateral after default 
is but one step in the liquidation process. Did the seller intend to 
resell the goods to others and hold the original buyers liable for 
any difference between the total resale price and the indebtedness of 
the original buyers on all items? Or did the seller perhaps intend to 
"rescind" the transactions after taking possession and treat the goods 
as stripped of the buyer's interest, so that he could then resell them 
without having to account for the proceeds of resale? 
29. Actually, the store succeeded in seizing only the items described in the opinion 
of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Ibid. 
30. Brief for Appellee, Exhibit "B," Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. & 
Thorne v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
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The transactions in Williams and Thorne were in fact conditional 
sales. At common law the conditional seller could, upon default by 
the buyer, repossess and keep the goods plus all payments made.81 
Under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, a seller acting under 
section 23 could cancel the contract and keep the goods plus pay-
ments made if, after notice, the buyer failed to redeem or request 
resale; if the buyer had paid at least fifty per cent of the purchase 
price, however, the seller was obliged under section 19 to resell and 
account for the proceeds. Part Five of Article Nine of the Code adopts 
the same general plan, except that it is sixty rather than fifty per 
cent that makes resale mandatory and such compulsory resale applies 
only to consumer goods.32 Under both uniform acts the seller may 
obtain a deficiency judgment against the buyer if proceeds from the 
resale are not enough to cover the indebtedness plus expenses.33 
Under the Code, however, resale must be conducted in a commer-
cially reasonable way.34 These provisions of the Code may work well 
in many cases, but it is not clear that they will work well in deter-
mining the seller's rights in goods and the extent of his deficiency 
claim if the original purchase price is inflated and exploitive. Finally, 
under the Code, it would be important for the seller to include in 
each sales contract a "cross collateral" clause making the specific 
items covered by the contract security not only for their own pur-
chase price but also for all other indebtedness of the buyer. Absent 
such a clause, the seller's right to keep the proceeds of an Article 
Nine foreclosure resale in excess of amounts due on each item sold 
would have to depend upon his possible right to set off the buyer's 
claim £or this excess against the seller's claim £or a deficiency arising 
from other transactions. 
The buyers' principal defense in Williams was that the contracts 
were unconscionable. In a two to one decision, the court of appeals 
reversed the lower court which had held that they were powerless to 
redress the alleged wrong done the defendants, and remanded the 
case for a hearing on the merits and appropriate findings. Williams 
is not a Code decision, since at the time of the transactions the Code 
had not yet been enacted in the District of Columbia; however, as 
Judge Wright put it, "in view of the absence of prior authority on 
the point, we consider the [subsequent] congressional adoption of 
§ 2-302 persuasive authority for following the rationale of the 
31. For fuller exposition, see UNIFORM CoNnmoNAL SALES Acr § 19 and the 
Commissioner's note thereto. 
32. u.c.c. § 9-505. 
33. u.c.c. § 9-504(2); UNIFORM CoNDmONAL SALES Acr § 22. 
34. u.c.c. § 9-504(3). 
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cases from which the section is explicitly derived."35 Williams may 
therefore be regarded as a section 2-302 case. 
What makes a transaction unconscionable? "The mores and busi-
ness practices of the time and place," the opinion tells us, must be 
considered in the test of unconscionability-a test which is "not 
simple," not to be "mechanically applied."36 These innocuous and 
rather sterile observations are coupled with other stronger ones 
which pose a threat to one-sided bargains in consumer transactions: 
Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an 
absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties to-
gether with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the 
other party. "Whether a meaningful choice is present in a particular 
case can only be determined by consideration of all the circumstances 
surrounding the transaction. In many cases the meaningfulness of 
the choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power. The 
manner in which the contract was entered is also relevant to this 
consideration. Did each party to the contract, considering his obvi-
ous education or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to under-
stand the terms of the contract, or were the important terms hidden 
in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices? 
Ordinarily, one who signs an agreement without full knowledge of 
its terms might be held to assume the risk that he has entered a one-
sided bargain. But when a party of little bargaining power, and 
hence little real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract 
with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his 
consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever 
given to all the terms. In such a case the usual rule that the terms 
of the agreement are not to be questioned should be abandoned and 
tl1e court should consider whether the terms of the contract are so 
unfair that enforcement should be withheld.37 
The significance of the decision is obscured because it is not a 
final decision on the merits and also because the comments in the 
majority opinion are difficult to apply in specific cases. But the 
decision does show that section 2-302 adds an unpredictable factor 
to installment sales and other consumer transactions. Pierre E. 
Dostert, who as Chief Staff Attorney for the Bar Association 
Legal Assistance Office successfully argued appellants' case, has stated: 
My personal comment on the cases is that they should never have 
been permitted by appellee to reach the appeals court. Poor cases 
make poor law. The law of these cases is not what I would call poor 
law; the problem of limitation of the effect of the decision is, how-
35. 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) [quoting in part CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 128 
(1963)]. 
26. Id. at 450. 
37. Id. at 449-50. 
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ever, difficult and subject to variation, thus creating a degree of 
uncertainty. 
The best effect of the decision lies in the fact that it is a dormant 
threat to unconscionable conduct which could become very active 
with little or no notice. In other words, sheer existence of Judge 
Wright's majority opinion has encouraged a greater degree of "con-
scionability" in my opinion. When the case enters the defense at 
trial level, plaintiffs seem to be much more disposed towards settle-
ment, rather than risk an adverse finding under a decision with a 
possible trial memorandum opinion applying the reasoning of Judge 
Wright.ss 
Was there anything inherently ·wrong about what the seller did 
in Williams? Forget for the nonce that he was dealing with an impov-
erished buyer who asserted that she did not understand the pro rata 
plan and would not have bought the stereo had she knmvn that the 
seller would continue to tie up all of her previous purchases. Is 
there any difference between this case and a case in which, to induce 
a loan or a credit sale, a person agrees to give the creditor a security 
interest in most of his personal property which he mvns outright? 
Or in which he gives his creditor a security interest in all such 
property to secure the balance of a consolidated indebtedness? Is it 
simply the indirectness of what was done that raises questions? 
The Code allows much in the name of freedom of contract: with 
few exceptions, a security agreement can impose a security interest 
upon any and all personal property of the debtor, including future 
property, to secure any and all obligations, including future obliga-
tions, that the debtor may owe the creditor. In only one relevant 
situation does the Code say no: section 9-204 provides that a security 
interest in consumer goods will not attach under an after-acquired 
property clause if the debtor acquires rights in the goods more than 
ten days after the secured party gives value. This may take care of a 
certain type of add-on clause-the prospective kind-but it does not 
forbid the use of a retroactive add-on clause in an agreement which 
consolidates prior and new indebtedness and makes the collateral 
38. Letter From Pierre E. Dostert to Robert H. Skilton, dated February I, 1967. It 
causes one to reflect upon the sometimes quixotic ways of justice to read in his letter 
that this litigation, involving amounts relatively small but nevertheless important to 
consumer interests, was conducted because the defendants were poor enough to qualify 
for legal aid. "I decided to take the two cases as far as necessary to achieve a precedent 
which would afford some protection to the lesser members of the community •.•• Trial, 
appeal to the D.C. Court of Appeals, and then to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals took 
210 man hours of legal work for which the appellants were not obligated to pay." If they 
had been obligated to pay, we daresay the store would have had its way without any 
legal contest. How often does this happen? Private litigation is hardly the complete 
answer to problems of consumer protection. For a good survey of the problems involved 
in effective implementation of programs intended to protect the consumer, see Com-
ment, 114 U. PAL. R.Ev. 395 (1966). See also Comment, 33 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 590 (1966). 
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which was security for prior indebtedness security for the consoli-
dated indebtedness. If there is something wrong in this arrangement, 
the ·wrong must be corrected by legislation apart from the Code. 
The appellants in Williams also argued that to allow the store 
to utilize the pro-rata clause to enforce its claim upon so much of 
appellants' household goods would, in effect, subvert the policy of 
the statutes of the District of Columbia exempting household goods 
from attachment.89 Of course, the statutes on their face do not pre-
vent creditors from taking security interests in such goods and then 
seizing them on default, but the point nevertheless has merit: if 
our exemption statutes are to accomplish their patent purpose of pro-
tecting debtors from complete impoverishment as a result of creditor 
action, their provisions should be correlated with statutory provi-
sions restricting the use of such property as security in certain kinds 
of transactions. 
In any event, Williams shows how section 2-302 can invade Article 
Nine situations. The security arrangements in a conditional sales 
transaction can easily be viewed as part of the terms of a sale to 
which section 2-302 clearly applies. Price, terms of payment, and 
the extent of the buyer's obligations are obviously terms of sale, and 
the security interest is simply ancillary to the obligation.40 Williams 
thus teaches that it is best to beware lest we be lulled by the seeming 
permissiveness of Article Nine: the voice of conscience must be heard 
in courts of justice. The principle of section 2-302 opposes exploita-
tion and antisocial conduct. It probably does not matter whether the 
party charged is seller or lender, secured or unsecured. As counsel 
for appellants stated in their brief: 
It is incumbent upon this Court to restate those equitable prin-
ciples and indicate the scope of their application to the Judges of 
the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, as part of the 
appellate function of this Court. In the General Sessions Court, there 
are thousands of cases tried each year which involve as litigants the 
lowliest of our society. Nothing is harder to explain in this world to 
these people than injustice produced by the unwillingness of the 
bench to deal with the substance of a transaction. These persons can-
not appreciate the limitations of the application of strict principles 
of law, nor should they be required to reason with the astuteness of 
a legal mind. 
Each time there is a substantial injustice in a court, there is in 
like degree a lessening of respect for the law, and the emotions of 
39. Brief for Appellant, pp. 24-26, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. &: 
Thorne v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
40. Another court has applied § 2-302 to the financing provisions of an installment 
sales contract. See American Home Improvement Inc. v. Madver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 
886 (1964). 
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anger and hate directed towards those persons pursuing injustice, 
and general antipathy toward the community which permits a sys-
tem of law capable of injustice to exist.41 
Further random thoughts about Williams: Stranger than fiction-
imagine selling a $515 stereo on credit to a woman on relief ... . 
The price the Thornes paid for a used refrigerator was $305.95 ... . 
In Williams the seller imposed no finance charges as such in his 
credit transactions with the plaintiff. Some sellers, catering to people 
who cannot pay cash, always sell on credit and, instead of adding a 
separate finance charge, simply inflate their prices. The District of 
Columbia did not have an all-goods installment act, but even if it 
had, imagine how difficult it would be to apply its ceilings on finance 
charges to sellers who always sell on credit and do not admit that 
they impose any finance charges . . . . Bailment-lease terminology 
still seems permissible under the Code, although section 1-201(37) 
tells us when the lessor's interest is merely a security interest. Article 
Nine takes no stand against the use of misleading language which in 
fact denies the existence of any rights in the debtor until full pay-
ment .... Counsel for appellants stressed the fact that the contracts 
were in fine print: 
The printed instruments of appellee are printed in unnecessarily 
small type, replete with cumbersome terminology, long sentences 
closely spaced and misleading statements. Counsel for appellants had 
great difficulty in the physical act of reading this document without 
a ruler to indicate the lines thereof and a magnifying glass to en-
large the print thereof to at least the size of the smallest newspaper 
type.42 
To which counsel for appellee replied, "if appellee is to be con-
demned for the alleged use of 'microscopic type size'-they find 
themselves in excellent company, with the Government of the United 
States of America, as appears from Exhibit 'A' of which appellee 
respectfully requests this Court to take judicial notice" (Exhibit 
"A" was a Department of Interior lease) .... 43 Apparently, the 
buyers were not given copies of the contracts they signed;44 some of 
the contracts Ora Williams signed were said to be "in blank" at the 
time she signed-whatever that means.45 Inducing people to sign 
their names to contracts which have terms to be filled in later is 
prohibited by most retail installment acts.46 
41. Appellant's brief, op. cit. supra note 39, at 11. 
42. Id. at 21-22. 
43. Appellee's brief, op. cit. supra note 30, at 22-23. 
44. Appellant's brief, op. cit. supra note 39, at 3. 
45. Ibid. 
46. See CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 301-10 (1965). 
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C. Section 9-206 and the Installment Buyer 
By no stretch of the imagination does Williams touch upon all 
of the points which may arise in a consumer installment sale under 
the Code. One of the areas which deserves at least brief discussion 
is the ability of an installment buyer to raise claims or defenses 
against the seller's assignee when he is called upon by the assignee 
to make payments. A vestigial remnant of the early concern for 
consumers that survived for a few years was a provision in section 
9-206 which, in the 1952 Official Text, read as follows: 
An agreement by a buyer of consumer goods as part of the con-
tract for sale that he ·will not assert against an assignee any claim or 
defense arising out of the sale is not enforceable by any person. If 
such a buyer as part of one transaction signs both a negotiable in-
strument and a security agreement even a holder in due course of 
the negotiable instrument is subject to such claims or defenses if he 
seeks to enforce the security interest either by proceeding under the 
security agreement or by attaching or levying upon the goods in an 
action upon the instrument. 
When the seller sells goods to or renders services for the buyer, and 
it subsequently turns out that the goods or services were not of the 
quality called for by the contract, the buyer normally may assert this 
breach of contract as a defense to the seller's collection of the out-
standing installments due under the contract. The same defense is 
available to the buyer if the seller has assigned the contract to a 
bank or finance company for collection, unless the buyer has agreed 
to waive all defenses against an assignee of the contract or has signed 
a negotiable note in connection with the contract. If the buyer has 
done either, the question then becomes whether the waiver of de-
fenses clause is enforceable or, in the latter situation, whether the 
holder of the note may have the status of a holder in due course.47 
It is these questions to which the early draft of section 9-206 ad-
dressed itself and the position taken at that time was that the buyer 
of consumer goods should be protected against such cutoff clauses 
and holders in due course. 
The section was changed in 1956,48 presumably because it was 
too controversial. It has been stated that sales finance companies 
found the provision difficult to accept.49 But, the provision was criti-
47. The matter is discussed fully in 2 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL 
PROPERTY 1088-106 (1965). 
48. See 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM Co111-
MERCIAL CODE 270-71. 
49. See Robinson &: Marsh, Some Observations on Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 63 DICK. L. REv. 45, 53 (1958). 
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cized by others because it failed to provide adequate protection to 
consumers: it only seemed to prevent the financing agency from at-
taching or levying upon the goods which were the subject of the 
installment sale and did not prevent the levying upon other property 
or the taking of other action against the buyer. 50 In any event, here, 
as with other consumer protection provisions, the draftsmen ap-
parently yielded to commercial interests, for section 9-206 in its 
present form disclaims any intention of providing special protection 
for consumers, although it does expressly leave the door open so that 
court decisions or other statutes could provide such protection. 
Some decisions and a few statutes had in fact given special pro-
tection to consumers (and occasionally to other buyers) against the 
cutting off of a buyer's defenses by waiver clauses and negotiable 
notes. Indeed, these probably were the inspiration for the 1952 pro-
visions in section 9-206 and its predecessors.51 A few more states have 
enacted such provisions since the time of the drafting of the Code, 
but the movement has been slow in gaining momentum.52 Moreover, 
the effectiveness of some of these efforts may be questioned, for the 
statutes establish a procedure which still permits the assignee to take 
the chattel paper free of a buyer's defenses: the buyer is given speci-
fied notice designed to inform him fully of the assignee's understand-
ing of the installment sales agreement; if the assignee's statement of 
the transaction is not correct, or if the buyer has some claim or de-
fense against the seller, the buyer must so inform the assignee within 
a short time-usually fifteen days.53 The fifteen-day period is likely 
to be too short for latent defects in the goods to show up. More 
important, it is questionable whether those consumers who most 
need the protection would read, understand, and comply with the 
notification requirement in any event. An effective rule would seem 
to require not only that a waiver of defenses provision be denied 
enforcement but also that the holder of a note given in connection 
with the consumer installment sale be made subject to such defenses 
to an action for payment as the buyer might have asserted against 
50. See Sutherland, Article 3-Logic, Experience and Negotiable Paper, 1952 WIS. 
L. R.Ev. 230, 235-40. It should be noted that an earlier draft provided better protection 
for consumers. Id. at 238. 
51. Sutherland, op. cit. supra note 50, at 235-37. Sutherland lists three states as hav-
ing statutes dealing with the subject as of the time of the writing of that article (1952). 
Id. at 237, n.22. Among the more recent commentaries on the holder in due course status 
of financing agencies are: Jones, Finance Companies as Holders in Due Course of Con-
sumer Paper, 1958 WASH. U.L.Q. 177; Comment, 55 Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 389 (1960). 
52. One source lists only six states as having such provisions in their installment 
sales acts as of the end of 1964. See CURRAN, op. cit. supra note 46, at 312-21 (chart 19, 
cols. 1 &: 3). 
53. E.g., CAL. CIV. Com;: § 1004.3 (1954); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 403 (McKinney 1962). 
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the seller. In addition, it might be desirable to prohibit the use of 
waiver clauses and negotiable notes in consumer credit sales. Such a 
prohibition by itself would not give complete protection, however, 
for an unscrupulous seller might disregard the prohibition, have the 
buyer sign a negotiable note, and then negotiate it to a holder in due 
course. 
It is of course understandable that financing agencies do not wish 
to be burdened with responsibilities relating to the goods sold if 
they possibly can avoid them, but there is at least some evidence that 
laws making the assignee subject to the buyer's defenses have not 
had that effect. 54 The number of cases in which a buyer cannot get 
satisfaction from his seller probably represents a very small pro-
portion of all credit sales; but, in the instances where such satisfaction 
is not forthcoming, the assignee of the chattel paper is in a better 
position to bear the loss than is the consumer. The financing agency 
need only investigate a seller's integrity before agreeing to buy his 
paper or employ such devices as recourse agreements and dealer 
reserves to absorb any losses that occur. 
III. LOOKING BEYOND THE CODE 
Recently the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have taken 
up the battle for the consumer. A proposed Uniform Consumer 
Credit Code is in draft form and will be submitted to the Commis-
sioners for their approval in the near future. 55 The tentative draft 
covers a variety of subjects pertaining to consumer credit transac-
tions, including those dealt with in early drafts of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 56 It properly recognizes that many of the consid-
erations that are pertinent to the installment sale are also applicable 
54. There is some evidence that the barring of waiver clauses or negotiable notes in 
consumer credit transactions does not present any great problem to financers. Thus, it 
has been said that Pennsylvania bankers experienced no trouble with the pre-1957 ver-
sion of U.C.C. § 9-206 which made assignees of installment sales contracts or holders of 
negotiable notes subject to defenses which a buyer of consumer goods might have as-
serted against the seller. Felix, Experience With Dealer and Consumer Financing Under 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 73 BANKING L.J. 229, 233 (1956). It also has been said 
that a 1943 decision of the New Mexico Supreme Court holding the financer subject to 
the buyer's defenses did not materially affect sales financing in that state. "The only 
real difference between pre- and post-1943 financing in New Mexico was that the financ-
ing institutions of the state required the retailer to establish a larger reserve to take 
care of possible warranty defenses." Vernon, Priorities, the Uniform Commercial Code 
and Consumer Financing, 4 B.C. IND. &: CoM. L. REv. 531, 547 (1963). 
55. For a general discussion of this project, see Dunham, Research for Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Legislation, 20 Bus. LAw 997 (1965). 
56. The draft on which these remarks are based is the Second Tentative Draft [\Vork-
ing Draft No. 4J. 
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to consumer installment loans, so both subjects are treated, albeit 
sometimes in different ways. 
We do not regard it as our function here to attempt a critique 
of the provisions of the proposed Credit Code, and we recognize that 
the provisions of the draft are subject to further change. Neverthe-
less, it may be appropriate to note briefly some of the topics dealt 
with. There are, for example, provisions typical of installment sales 
statutes requiring disclosure of certain kinds of credit information. 57 
Presumably if such information is made available to the consumer, 
he will be able to shop more wisely for his credit. But the draftsmen 
have recognized that consumer education and disclosure of credit 
information are only small steps toward the goal of equalizing the 
bargaining power of the parties-at best, they are long range solu-
tions. Consequently, there are also provisions which tend to limit the 
extent to which the parties may bargain. Among these are provisions 
for maximum rates which may be charged by the seller or lender,58 
provisions regulating the length of terms of small consumer loans, 59 
provisions giving the consumer prepayment rights, 60 and provisions 
restricting the use of contractual terms calling for balloon payments. 61 
The draftsmen borrowed a provision on unconscionability di-
rectly from the Uniform Commercial Code, but its terms will ex-
pressly apply to sales of services and to consumer leases as well as to 
sales of goods.62 The draftsmen have also grappled with waiver 
clauses and negotiable notes which, as we have seen, can have the 
effect of freeing a seller's financer from defenses which the buyer 
could have asserted against the seller. The draft provides that waiver 
clauses in consumer credit sales or leases are unenforceable and that 
the taking of negotiable notes in consumer credit sales and leases is 
prohibited. 63 
The proposed Credit Code's tentative provisions dealing with 
the taking of collateral in consumer sale or consumer loan trans-
actions extend far beyond the restrictions imposed by section 9-204 
(4)(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code. The taking of security 
interests in real estate in connection with small consumer loans and 
consumer credit sales is largely prohibited. 64 As a general rule, an 
57. CREDIT CODE §§ 2.301-.311 (consumer credit sales) &: 3.301-.310 (consumer loans). 
58. Id. §§ 2.201-.208 (consumer credit sales), 3.201-.208, 3.508 &: 3.602 (regulated loans 
and other than consumer loans). 
59. Id. § 3.512. 
60. Id. §§ 2.401 & 3.401. 
61. Id, §§ 2.405 & 3.402. 
62. Id. § 2.412, dealing with unconscionability, applies to a "consumer credit sale" 
which is defined by § 2.104 to include a sale of services. 
63. Id. §§ 2.403 &: .404. 
64. Id, §§ 2.407 &: 3.510. 
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installment seller's taking of a security interest in goods other than 
the goods sold in that particular sale also is prohibited, but an 
important exception is made for cross collateral: the Credit Code 
would permit a seller of goods to secure the debt arising from the 
present sale with goods he had previously sold to the buyer if the 
seller holds an existing security interest in them. Goods sold in a 
present sale also could be made security for a debt owing under 
a previous sale. However, the pro-rating formula for determining 
when a security interest in particular goods is released is more favor-
able to the consumer than the one involved in Williams, although 
not as favorable as the formula used in at least one present install-
ment sales law.65 The assignment of wages as security for the payment 
of a debt arising out of a consumer credit sale or lease or out of a 
consumer loan is prohibited.66 
The proposed Credit Code would make important changes in 
remedies as well. The Credit Code recognizes, for instance, that in 
many situations it would be to the installment buyer's advantage to 
limit the seller's remedy to realization on the buyer's collateral. The 
Credit Code proposes to do this by a provision stating that, if the 
unpaid balance at the time of repossession is $500 or less, the seller 
has no right to hold the buyer personally liable for the unpaid 
balance, but he may recover damages if the buyer wrongfully dam-
aged the collateral or, after default, ·wrongfully failed to make the 
collateral available to the seller upon proper demand. 67 Wage gar-
nishments prior to judgment would be prohibited and, perhaps more 
important, would in all cases be restricted to earnings of the debtor 
in excess of a specified amount in any calendar week. 68 
Certain home solicitation sales would also be subjected to regula-
tion.00 Here, a controversial provision has been proposed which 
would give the buyer a right to cancel the sale. Although the right 
would have to be exercised by midnight of the second calendar day 
65. See id. §§ 2.407 to .409. The pro-rating formula set forth in § 2.409 states that the 
payments made subsequent to the debt consolidation are deemed to have been applied 
to the debts arising from the various sales in the same proportion as the original debts 
arising from those sales bear to one another, instead of in the proportion that the 
amounts still owing at the time of each payment bear to one another. The latter seems 
to have been the formula applied by the seller in Williams. Williams v. Walker-Thomas 
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (1965). Another possible formula is used in the Massachu-
setts installment sales act. MASS. Acrs 1966, ch. 284, § 18B provides that "payments 
made under the consolidated agreement shall be applied toward the unpaid amounts in 
the order of the purchase of the goods or services." 
66. CREDIT CODE §§ 2.410 &: 3.403. 
67. Id. § 5.103. 
68. Id. §§ 5.104 &: .105. 
69. Id. §§ 2.501 to .506. 
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after the day on which the buyer signed the agreement, and a cancel-
lation charge would be made, the provision would give the buyer an 
important cooling-off period in which to reconsider a bargain which 
he may have entered under considerable pressure. The proposed 
Credit Code would also regulate credit insurance, 70 and regulate and 
require the licensing of debt-counseling agencies.71 
It is evident that the diverse provisions of the proposed Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code would not have fit comfortably within the 
confines of the Uniform Commercial Code. It is also clear that the 
Credit Code's proposals, addressed as they are to specific problems, 
can provide much more effective protection for the consumer than 
that afforded by the possible invocation of section 2-302 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code in extreme cases. It remains to be seen how 
effective the final provisions of the Credit Code will be, and how 
widely it will be adopted. One can hope, however, that the sponsors 
and draftsmen will succeed in their goal of ridding the credit indus-
try of the harmful practices of the minority while at the same time 
encouraging the use of legitimate sources of credit.72 If this comes to 
pass, and the Credit Code is widely adopted, the retrenchment by 
the draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code from their early 
consumer-oriented position may well have been a blessing in disguise 
to the consumer. 
70. Id. §§ 4.101 to .207. 
71. Id. §§ 7.101 to .114. 
72. See REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALES, CONSUMER 
CREDIT, SMALL LOANS AND USURY TO THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON 
UNIFORM STATE LAws 10 (1965). 
